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This paper aims to show that Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, such
as it is expounded in The Scientiﬁc Image, ends up in considerable difﬁculties
in the philosophy of science. The main problem would be the exclusion of
mathematics from the conception of science, given its clear absence of empirical
adequacy, which is the most important requirement of his formulation. In this
sense, it is suggested a more inclusive formulation of scientiﬁc theory, aroused
from the notion of Da Costa’s (1999) simple structure, considering the notion
of scientiﬁc discovery in a strict sense, and the validity limit of a theory and the
formalism used in a temporal context.
Le physicien qui vient de renoncer à une de ses hypothèses
devrait être (. . .) plein de joie car il vient de trouver une
occasion inespérée de découverte. Son hypothèse, j’imagine,
n’avait pas été adoptée à la légère ; elle tenait compte de tous
les facteurs connus qui semblaient pouvoir intervenir dans
le phénomène. Si la vériﬁcation ne se fait pas, c’est qu’il y a
quelque chose d’inattendu, d’extraordinaire ; c’est qu’on va
trouver de l’inconnu et du nouveau.
Henri Poincaré, La science et l’hypothèse.
1. Introduction
Bas van Fraassen’s empirical constructivism belongs to a traditional philosophy
line known by the pursuit of “saving the phenomena” or “saving the appear-
ances”. Geminus (ﬁrst century BC) seems to have been the ﬁrst thinker to put
forward this thesis as regards to a speciﬁc scientiﬁc domain, namely Astron-
omy. According to Simplicius (1913), Geminus observed the existence of two
approaches in the study of celestial phenomena. The ﬁrst one is the physicist’s,
who deduces the celestial bodies’ movement from their essential nature. The sec-
ond one is the astronomer’s, who draws the celestial bodies’ motions from the
mathematical shapes and movements. So, according to Geminus, astronomers
are not interested in knowing what there is by its nature, but in formulating hy-
potheses according to which bodies either move or keep still, and following to
that they consider whether the hypotheses explain what has been observed.
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Andreas Osiander’s instrumentalism belongs to the latter line, since he claims
that Copernicus’ calculations, employed in his world system, are liable to substi-
tution without affecting what is observed. George Berkeley’s criticisms to Newto-
nian physics, defending the supremacy of equations over “obscure hypotheses”,
produced elements for Ernst Mach to deepen those criticisms and to propose,
perhaps for the ﬁrst time in the philosophy of science, the notions of refutation as
well as conﬁrmation, as scientiﬁc ideals. This conception also took him to con-
sider, somehow following Hume, function as a much more mature notion than
cause. As is well known, Logical Empiricism inherited part of Mach’s ideas, and
the criticisms they put against metaphysics boosted non-realistic theses about the
so-called theoretical terms or “unobservables”.1
As a result, the novelty of van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism lies in his
use of the semantic conception of scientiﬁc theories, particularly the notions of
structure and isomorphism, stating the latter in the geometric sense, fundamen-
tally in order to hold that scientiﬁc theories “save the appearances”.
The main goal of this paper is to show that this conception — saving the
appearances — seems inadequate as regards three aspects. First, because Con-
structive Empiricism does not take discoveries as important in the elaboration
of scientiﬁc theories. Secondly, but as well importantly, the constructive empiri-
cism’s conception of scientiﬁc theory, as stated by van Fraassen in Scientiﬁc Image,
does not include mathematics, being restricted to empirical sciences. Last, in part
as a consequence of the ﬁrst aspect, scientiﬁc realism is rejected, and the “cosmic
coincidence” argument (Smart 1968) is considered in a pragmatic way, which
will be discussed later on.
It is important here to make a distinction that will clarify what we take to be
some difﬁculties in Empirical Constructivism, bearing in mind that in our criti-
cism we favour a notion of discovery that some authors call invention (Paty 2001).
In this way, invention, which comes out of a “human creation” act, as Einstein2
(1949) used to call it, is an initial conjecture of a theory, which conveys to deﬁ-
nitions and/or principles, and which corresponds to “empirical substructures” (it
carries out the empirical adequacy, to use van Fraassen’s terminology). How-
ever, by way of improving a notion we have already developed before (Simon
2005), we restrict the term “discovery” to the necessary results (quantitative or
in strictly theoretical terms — chieﬂy mathematical), bearing in mind the initial
assumptions adopted. Consequently, the expression “scientiﬁc discovery” will be
here understood as a result in which concepts necessarily originated from certain
theoretical statements become constitutive of the theory. There are countless
examples of this in many scientiﬁc domains, including mathematics — that is
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why the second critical aspect pointed out above — and we will come back to
this later on.
We would like to emphasize that what we call scientiﬁc discovery includes
Lakatos’ new facts, Frederico Enriques’ theory extension, Philipp Frank’s theory
dynamics and Kurt Gödel’s veriﬁable consequences (referring to mathematics). In
other words, discovery3 derives from some structures (postulates, interpretations,
and relationships among objects of a domain) and, as it consolidates the theory
it also becomes one of the decisive elements in the theory’s deﬁnition itself. It is
worth remembering that discovery may be associated to certain empirical mea-
sures or even only to strictly theoretical concepts, although in science, as is widely
accepted today, an empirical data is also theoretical.
Some examples might clarify our point of view. The electro-magnetic ﬁeld,
discovered after Maxwell’s theory; the notions of spatial contraction and tempo-
ral expansion, which follow from the Restricted Relativity Theory postulates and
from the deﬁnition of simultaneity; the inﬁnitude of prime numbers, a theorem
originated from the properties of these numbers; the genetic code, among many
other concepts and relations, result from scientiﬁc theories and do not seem to
be consequence of empirical adequacy, in the sense employed by van Fraassen.4
Thus, it follows from scientiﬁc discovery a process of theory construction —
which is admitted by van Fraassen.5 but not as the result of a process of discovery
— that falls in two aspects: the domain of the theory’s validity redeﬁnes it at
the same time as occurs a reﬁnement of language or its formalism (in the natural
sciences case). We will come back to the problem of validity domain later on.
As regards the theory language or its formalism, we should note that it results
from a development of certain theories, which bring about new theories by the
incorporation of concepts, often in various domains of a science.6 If, on the one
hand, formalism is situated in a period of “normal science” in its origins, it can be
incorporated to another domain in a posterior moment. A good example of this
is the Hamiltonian formulation, which is useful both in classical and quantum
mechanics, but which was originated from developments of the former, particu-
larly from the particles classical theory. In other words, formalism may increase
the empirical basis of theories and also enable new discoveries.
A last comment regarding van Fraassen’s formulation concerning Construc-
tive Empiricism. In his proposition, “scientiﬁc activity is one of construction
rather discovery: construction of models that must be adequate to he phenom-
ena, and not discovery of truth concerning unobservable” (van Fraassen 1980,
p. 5). The meaning of empirical adequacy for van Fraassen is that the theory
“has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to the empirical sub-
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structures of that model” (p. 64). In other words, scientiﬁc activity is the activity
of model construction, which aims to empirical adequacy (and “not discovery
of truth concerning the unobservable”). In our view, this proposition should be
reformulated as follows: empirical science aims to the adequacy among the the-
ory’s models and the empirical substructures (since only empirical science admits
empirical adequacy). This formulation makes more evident the deﬁnition’s limi-
tation, since mathematics is not included, which shows the need of a deﬁnition of
science’s aims. We also consider inadequate the expression “scientiﬁc activity”,
for it may involve other elements, sociological for example, and not only those
associated to justiﬁcation, as van Fraassen means.
Lastly, we are not going to examine the troubling question of whether van
Fraassen’s deﬁnition of scientiﬁc activity is true. . .
In this article, by means of employing a simple structural conception of scien-
tiﬁc theory (Da Costa 1999) and the notion of theoretical incorporation (Mouli-
nes 1997) we aim to show that:
(1) A scientiﬁc theory cannot be mixed up with a scientiﬁc domain;
(2) It seems to be needed, for a complete deﬁnition of scientiﬁc theory, to
incorporate to it either an axiomatic part or its statements;
(3) In the deﬁnition of theory, in order to complete it, one should to incorpo-
rate scientiﬁc discovery.
(4) One may say then that a scientiﬁc theory is given by a structure, its va-
lidity domain, its axioms and theorems; in other words, discoveries origi-
nated from axioms in a certain validity domain are given from the inside
of some structure.
2. Deﬁnition of Scientiﬁc Theory
Starting from the deﬁnition of simple structural theory given by Da Costa7 (1999,
p. 169), we deﬁne as a scientiﬁc theory the triplet T = 〈Γ,U,Δ〉,8 in which Γ is
a set of propositions, U is the structure that satisﬁes those propositions, and Δ
is the validity domain of the theory.9 The inclusion of Γ in the deﬁnition comes
to be necessary, because semantic conceptions often consider the axiomatizable
part of relationships in U, but they do not spell it out enough (Suppes 1957,
cap. 12).
The presence of Δ in the deﬁnition and the explicit character of central ax-
ioms are evidence of the theory’s historicity, bearing in mind that the validity
domains are progressively incorporated, after their original formulation — where
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the axioms are present, not always by means of equations —, and they turn out
to be the fundamental part of the theory. The inclusion of the validity domain in
the deﬁnition is also very decisive, and is a great deal entailed by scientiﬁc discov-
eries, — often given by new theories that impose the old theory’s validity region
— and do not result exclusively from a process of empirical adequacy. Although
van Fraassen claims that previsions — where we could include discoveries —,
result from a competition among theories, this formulation seems too narrow for
two reasons. First, because it is excluded from the scientiﬁc domain, bearing in
mind the restriction of empirical adequacy10, as we said above. Second, because,
as we will see, van Fraassen produces a feeble argument for the existence of previ-
sions (or discoveries, as we prefer). We will return to the problem of mathematics
shortly. Let us go back to Suppes’ semantic conception.
Suppes (1957) proposes the following formulation for the “Classical Parti-
cles Mechanics”: the basic structure of this “theory” is axiomatized by deﬁning,
through theoretical tools provided by logic and set theory, the MCP predicate.
The deﬁning conditions of this predicate are what normally are considered the
axioms of the theory. This way, MCP(x) if and only if P, T, s, m, f , such that:
(1) x = 〈P,T, s,m, f〉.
(2) P is a ﬁnite non-empty set (that represents a set of physical particles).
(3) T is a closed interval of real numbers (that represents the time interval
during which the particles are considered).
(4) s is a function of the Cartesian product P × T in vectorial space R3, two
times distinguishable in T (s represents the function that determines the
position in the space of each particle in each instant).
(5) m is a function of P in real positive numbers (that represents each parti-
cles’ mass).
(6) f is a function P×T in R3 (that represents the resulting force that acts on
each particle in each instant).
(7) For all p in P and for all t in T, we have:
m(p).D2t (p, t) = f(p, t)
Some remarks may be made to Suppes’ proposal. First, we observe that ex-
pression (7) is, evidently, Newton’s second law. The Newtonian statement is
present at MCP(x) predicate, but according to a formalization adopted after New-
ton’s original work. In other words, Suppes keeps the Newtonian axiom, but does
so in a modern version, enouncing its equation. It gets clear then that the predi-
cate expressed by Suppes conveys the formalism of a certain moment. The theory
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is then expressed beyond its axioms — an idea that is not always presented by
a semantic conception such as van Fraassen’s — in a formalism that incorpo-
rated the interpretation and other elements that were shown to be historically
important. We would like to insist on that propositions seem to us determinant
in theories that have their origins or enhancements through principles. In this
sense, we argue that theories may be expressed in spaces of states, as van Fraassen
(1980, p. 196) hold, but these are determined in time trajectories, which have se-
lected the logically possible sequences. However, this solution is given historically,
taking into account scientiﬁc discovery.
Given the formalization enounced above, we would like to propose the fol-
lowing deﬁnition and formalization for a scientiﬁc theory, taking into account
the historical dimension: a scientiﬁc theory is given by T(t1) = 〈Γ,U,Δ〉t1 , being
t1 its creation moment. Considering van Fraassen’s proposal, we could say that
a theory would be given by T(ti) = 〈Γ,U,Δ〉ti , where ti is the historical moment
taken, including the admitted formalization, such that T would run the state
spaces t1, t2, . . . , tn, until having its validity limit deﬁnitely stipulated. In the for-
mer Suppes’ example there is a value ti such that the validity domain has been
determined, in the case of classical particles theory, at the moment when the
Relativity Theory showed that this theory is valid to v  c. This way, ti = 1905;
that is, Δ expresses the upper limit for particles motion (or the mass center for
bodies in general).
The possibility of continually improving a formalism implies that there is not
a limit for n inside the theory itself, and that only the negation of certain axioms
will lead to new theories. It is worth noting that the formalism itself may suggest
new uniﬁcations that will lead to new scientiﬁc areas, such as Lagrange’s and
Hamilton’s formalisms, which permit the incorporation of systems where energy
or potentials may be considered.
In this sense, a space of states that are logically and historically taken could
be given (approximately) by the following sequence for the Newtonian theory of
particles:
T(ti) = 〈Γ,U,Δ〉ti , where, for t1 = 1687, we have the original Newtonian formu-
lation; for t2 = 1743, D’Alembert’s formulation; for t3 = 1744 Euler’s formula-
tion; t4 = 1788, Lagrange’s formulation; for t5 = 1835, Hamilton’s formulation,
and so on. Each of these formulations allows a theory expansion, which is differ-
ent from the original theory. This way, a theory T in t1, incorporating discoveries
or only the invention (creation), which will be present inU and Δ, will take to the
following sequence: T(t1)→ T(t2)→ . . .→ T(tn).
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As a result, the adoption of the theory in a given moment depends not only on
its logical consistency, but also on the possibility of discoveries that are either new
experimental ones or merely theoretical. It is in the latter case that mathematics
is included.
3. Empirical Adequacy and Mathematics
The difﬁculty to van Fraassen’s formulation pointed out above, that is, the ex-
clusion of mathematics from the scientiﬁc domain looks serious to us. In order
to include it, a new unifying criterion is necessary. It is in this sense that the no-
tion of discovery or conceptual expansion or “veriﬁable consequences”, as Gödel
suggests, can be more adequate as a criterion for the acceptance of a scientiﬁc
theory. For Gödel, there could be axioms
So plentiful in their veriﬁable consequences, that cast so much light on
a whole discipline, and that furnished so powerful methods for solving
problems (. . . ) that, no matter its intrinsic necessity, they would have to
be assumed at least in the sense of any well succeeded physical theory.
(Gödel 1947, apud Lakatos 1978, p. 26)
An attempt to sort this acknowledged difﬁculty out, and adopting van Fraas-
sen’s constructive empiricist program is developed by Bueno (1999a, p. 158ss
and 289ss; 1999b, S482). However, the author looks for an approximation be-
tween constructive empiricism in empirical sciences and mathematics. In a ﬁrst
moment, Bueno (1999a, p. 158) insists in defending the theory and starts from
the notion of pragmatic truth, as developed by Da Costa (1999, p. 170), transpos-
ing it by analogy to a coherence sense of truth. However, we see problems in this
formulation, for the normal structures employed by him bear the requirement of
“saving the appearances” in their origin, as formulated by Da Costa.
In a second moment, Bueno (1999b, S482) tries an axiological formulation
of the constructive empiricist proposal, eliminating the notion of truth in both
cases. In other words, like empirical sciences, mathematics would be in search of
truth, but of a quasi-truth. However, the author poses a too strong constraint.
Starting from Hartry Field’s (1980, 1989) notion of conservativeness, and adapting
the nominalist strategy, Bueno proposes that a mathematical theory M is weakly
conservative “if it is quasi-true in a partial structure with respect to a consistent
body N of nominalistic claims”. (Bueno 1999b, p. S482). And concludes that “M
is weakly conservative iff M is consistent with some internally consistent body of
claims about the physical word” (ibid.).11
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It looks to us that, in both cases, the requirements are too strong. We hold
that the emphasis on discoveries, as occurs in empirical sciences, satisﬁes math-
ematical theories, since the validity domain will be given by discoveries (now
mathematical) that come out from the theory itself and by the restrictions (valid-
ity limits) imposed by the new theories. Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries
are good examples of theoretical evolution in mathematics (for space properties,
in the case at issue) and the above formulation is able to satisfy it. For example:
if the addition of a triangle’s angles is equal to two straight angles we are in an
Euclidean regimen, otherwise we are in non-Euclidean regimens.
4. Empirical Adequacy, Success and Scientiﬁc Realism
Let us return to the problem of the relationship between empirical adequacy and
discovery. For van Fraassen, prevision results from a competition among theories
instead of a discovery process. Let us examine an example given by him, although
it has nothing to do with the one from Particles Classical Theory we have treated
so far. This analysis shows us that van Fraassen looks for an a posteriori instance,
hence taken from the history of science, for a pragmatic foundation, which is im-
portant as a complement of his logical argument. The reason is as follows: in
order to reply the criticisms against his proposal that the problem of prevision
has not been properly dealt with, the antirealist position of constructive empiri-
cism opts for the pragmatic aspect of the theory. In other words, the theory that
surpasses its rival is the one that becomes the most successful. Now, this does
not occur very often in the history of science and the example above has shown
that the case was of evolution, formalism enhancement and discoveries instead
of competition.
The example examined by van Fraassen is von Neumann’s study of hidden
variables formulation. Von Neumann has established that observable quantities
are represented by operators A, B,. . . , each of them is associated to an inﬁnite
matrix (Ai) and also a function 〈A〉, which gives the expected value 〈A〉φ in any
state φ. According to van Fraassen (1980, p. 53), when von Neumann formulated
his own theory, he could have chosen one of the following principles regarding
the combination of observable quantities in order to serve as an axiom:
1. 〈aA + bB〉φ = a〈A〉φ + b〈B〉φ
2. (aA + bB)ij = a(A)ij + b(B)ij
Van Fraassen argues that, depending on the choice, von Neumann could have
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concluded for the existence or not of hidden variables. His choice took him to
the denial of these variables, being pragmatic then:
Such pragmatic superiorities of one theory over another are of course
very important for the progress of science. But since they can appear
even between different formulations of the same theory and also may
only show up in actual defeat, they are no reﬂection on what the theory
itself says about what is observables. (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 53)
This conclusion is directly linked to two other theses by him presented at the
beginning of this paper: the difference between observables and unobservables,
on the one hand, and between belief in the truth of a theory and empirical ad-
equacy, on the other hand. For van Fraassen, there is no ontology — or realism
— possible to be afﬁrmed about the unobservable entities of a theory, but only its
empirical adequacy.
Van Fraassen is clearly an antirealist and his conception of empirical adequacy
makes a sharp distinction between an exclusive belief in adequacy, instead of
unobservable entities or in the so-called theoretical terms. However, as some
authors observe (cf. Moulines 2006, p. 127), the unobservability criterion is not
clear in van Fraassen’ thought, for what is unobservable today may not to be so
later; there is no need in pointing out all the innumerable examples of this in the
history of science. In this matter, these authors are right and the Constructive
Empiricism’s antirealist argument loses much of its force.
Returning to the example of hidden variables chosen by van Fraassen, it is
doubtful the assertion that von Neumann’s choice is pragmatic in a strict sense.
Even if we consider discovery as a pragmatic criterion — which could have been
invoked in the above example — it is founded in the discovery of entities taken
in a realistic context. This is because the novelty lies not in empirical adequacy,
but in the existence of those new entities, which were unknown before. An
unobservable associated to a new phenomenon is not merely a matter of empirical
adequacy, since “adequacy” itself comes up with and after the unobservable, even
in Quantum Mechanics. The examples in physics and even in mathematics are
plentiful enough and some of them have been pointed out here.
5. Conclusion
The possibility of incorporating mathematics in a deﬁnition of scientiﬁc theory
arises as the most considerable advantage of the formulation here proposed by us.
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Having his source in the need of incorporating scientiﬁc discovery, as historically
given, in the deﬁnition of scientiﬁc theory, this deﬁnition of scientiﬁc theory seem
more inclusive than the one proposed by Van Fraassen.
The notion of empirical adequacy, a central issue in the criticism directed
to scientiﬁc realism, is logically unimpeachable when we refer to empirical sci-
ences, but it excludes formal sciences. Moreover, the theory’s pragmatic virtue
defense as a solution for the “cosmic coincidence” problem, that is, the thesis
that competition among theories takes to the ﬁttest in a given moment. Besides,
it is also limited as a reply to realists. It is not always that a scientiﬁc theory
competes with other ones, as it occurred in the Newtonian case.12 In fact, it was
a theoretical improvement, on the one hand, and the restrictions in its validity
domain, on the other hand, which took the classical particles theory to a mature
formulation. The conceptualization here proposed makes clearer the distinction
between a “scientiﬁc domain”, like classical mechanics, and the various theories
of which it is composed, such as elasticity theory, gravitation theory and so on.
What van Fraassen calls theory models are often other theories, which should
satisfy a theory speciﬁc criterion, and not a general criterion, which mixes up the
notions of scientiﬁc domain and scientiﬁc theory.
The incorporation of scientiﬁc discovery to the deﬁnition of theory may help
to clarify an old problem in the philosophy of science, namely, inter-theoretical
change, according to Moulines’ terminology (1997, p. 449). Inter-theoretical
change should take into account formalism improvement, but above the discov-
eries that come out of these new formalisms or even of new concepts’ incorpo-
ration that are absent from the original formulation. However, when one refers
to a theory, one should, in our view, to refer to the formulation at issue, because
the novelties in a theory depend on which moment in history we are referring
to. This certainly does not mean relativism, since former determinations, either
experimental or strictly theoretical, are preserved in posterior formulations.
Discovery arises then as one of the main aims of science and allows theo-
retical novelty, particularly those of unobservables, namely, either as coherence
inside a theory — as in mathematics — or as indirect experimental evidence —
as in empirical sciences, or even taking to new connections, and so to new theo-
ries. It looks that it is possible to admit the concept of truth in sciences, namely
the coherentist one in mathematics and the approximate correspondence one
(in Tarski’s sense), in empirical sciences. We may conclude that science, as an
activity that searches for expressing theories about social and natural phenom-
ena, apart from the strictly formal relations, also looks for the (approximated)
truth of theoretical terms. This search may include the attempt of constructing
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certain natural species and, above all, their relations, keeping the notion of causal
relation13 among unorbservables.
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O presente trabalho busca mostrar que o empirismo construtivo de Bas van
Fraassen, segundo enunciado em sua obra The Scientiﬁc Image, conduz a
diﬁculdades consideráveis em ﬁlosoﬁa da ciência. A principal diﬁculdade seria
a exclusão da matemática dessa concepção, por sua clara ausência de ade-
quação empírica, sendo essa a mais importante exigência da formulação de
van Fraassen. Nesse sentido, é proposto uma formulação mais ampla de te-
oria cientíﬁca, oriunda a noção de estrutura simples de Da Costa (1999),
considerando a noção de descoberta cientíﬁca num sentido estrito, o limite de
validade da teoria e o formalismo utilizado, num contexto temporal.
Palavras-chave
Adequação empírica, descoberta cientíﬁca, teoria cientíﬁca.
Notes
1 We are not suggesting that the Vienna Circle members are all anti-realist. Their episte-
mological conceptions vary considerably as regards the problem of scientiﬁc realism. On
this, see a conception of empirical realism such as Moritz Schlick’s. Cf. Schlick 1932.
2 In all his writings, Einstein emphasizes the role of experience and well established the-
ories as guides in this act of creation.
3 Always when we use the term “discovery” we mean “scientiﬁc discovery”.
4 It is worth noting that, in general, van Fraassen’s criterion is very appropriate, both in
a logical and in a historical sense. However, as we will see in the following, he holds
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that the main belief of scientiﬁc activity appears in the search for empirical adequacy
exclusively. It is this restriction that we disagree with.
5 More rigorously, the construction of models, according to van Fraassen. See below.
6 Paty examines the role of mathematics in its relationship with physics and classiﬁes this
process as entraînement — dragging — of the latter by the former. Paty 2002.
7 According to Da Costa, a theory T may be identiﬁed to the triplet AT = 〈E,Δ,R〉,
where E is a kind of structure, Δ is T’s application domain, R is the set of techniques and
processes that link T to experience.
8 A more adequate formulation for T could be given by: T = 〈Γ,U, S,Δ〉, where S
stands for the relationship of satisfactibility — in Tarski’s terms (cf. Branquinho, Murcho
and Gomes 2006, p. 797) — between Γ andU.
9 We consider more adequate the expression “theory validity domain” instead of “theory
application domains” (Da Costa 1999, p. 169); we do not include in our formulation, as
Da Costa does, the “set of techniques and processes” that link T to the experience.
10 Bueno (1999b, 2000) keeps the empirical adequacy criterion, even in the mathemat-
ics’ domain. However, as we will see, this proposal also looks problematic.
11 In a third moment, Bueno presents a formulation a little more general, but still keeps
the need of empirical “reference” for mathematics. Insisting in the notion of quasi-truth,
he asserts: “If the aim of mathematics is quasi-truth, a mathematical theory does not
need to map, in complete detail, every aspect of the domain to which it is applied. It
sufﬁces if it accommodates certain aspects of this domain”. (Bueno 2000, p. 226). Now,
it does not seem to be needed any reference of this type in order to deﬁne mathematical
knowledge. It is in this sense that the notion of discovery looks more general to us.
12 Berkeley’s criticisms to inﬁnitesimals in mathematics and the criticisms to Newtonian
absolute space cannot be taken as an alternative theory, although the latter have become
important in Mach’s criticism to mechanics. Mach’s criticism, as is known, was important
to the ediﬁcation of the Relativity Theory.
13 A formulation that looks proper to us has recently been developed by Richard Corry.
Improving Nancy Cartwright’s (1999) notion of causation, this author defends a “causal
realism” in science. “Causal realism allows to formulate laws of the form ‘when a ﬁnite
number of quite localized things hold at one time, there will be a causal inﬂuence directed
toward some particular effect’ ” (Corry 2006, p. 273).
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